Though the counterargument is that by creating a deep market into which they can sell their works and rights, creators benefit.
I suspect that particular counter is readily debunked by looking at the amount of money made by huge middleman industries (publishers, record labels, movie studios, etc.) compared to the original artists (authors, editors, musicians, producers, actors, directors, etc.). In particular, how many artists ultimately receive very low compensation for their efforts relative to the proven actual value of the work they create?
Then the marketing/distribution engines have to start justifying their existence based on additional value generated for the original creators of the work. However, it seems likely that any such justification would also support a model where the original creators retain the fundamental rights, and instead only a short-term exclusive licence can be granted to a distributor, who can then renegotiate with the artist to renew their exclusive licence a year or two later (presumably if and only if the distributor still thinks the work is worth promoting and the creators still think they're getting a fair deal).
You'd need some sort of collective licensing arrangement so that one make-up artist or background musician who worked on your blockbuster film couldn't screw up the whole distribution chain by withholding consent, but again that could probably be addressed by tying any decision-making authority to the original artists with some sort of quorum requirement and some sort of up-front agreement on the distribution of any future returns.
Yes, you've fleshed out pretty much exactly the argument I'd been vaguely pointing at.
There's a tremendous amount of pricing and negotiating strength which comes from power imbalances that are misrepresented as market forces. Pitching these as "the market decides" both takes guilt and fault out of the equation and masks what's actually going on. It's a matter which Adam Smith was aware of and spoke of at length -- much of Wealth of Nations concerns these relationships and much of the rest of it is mis-read to studiously ignore this fact.
I agree with you that short-term contracts (a year, possibly two) should be the limit of what can be struck with an author or artist. Another is for mechanical licenses (the spoiler effect -- another element Smith considers).
I suspect that particular counter is readily debunked by looking at the amount of money made by huge middleman industries (publishers, record labels, movie studios, etc.) compared to the original artists (authors, editors, musicians, producers, actors, directors, etc.). In particular, how many artists ultimately receive very low compensation for their efforts relative to the proven actual value of the work they create?
Then the marketing/distribution engines have to start justifying their existence based on additional value generated for the original creators of the work. However, it seems likely that any such justification would also support a model where the original creators retain the fundamental rights, and instead only a short-term exclusive licence can be granted to a distributor, who can then renegotiate with the artist to renew their exclusive licence a year or two later (presumably if and only if the distributor still thinks the work is worth promoting and the creators still think they're getting a fair deal).
You'd need some sort of collective licensing arrangement so that one make-up artist or background musician who worked on your blockbuster film couldn't screw up the whole distribution chain by withholding consent, but again that could probably be addressed by tying any decision-making authority to the original artists with some sort of quorum requirement and some sort of up-front agreement on the distribution of any future returns.