One possible approach that might have helped in the Air France case might be to let the pilots know what the plane doesn't know, instead of bombarding them with the unsolvable problems it did know.
At one point, they were at full thrust, nose-up, and climbing, yet in the heat of a storm of warnings, they failed to recognize that the airframe, engines, wings were all performing exactly as designed, aside from a panicking computer.
At that point they had completely lost situational awareness, and held the plane nose-up and falling until it contacted the water. If they had been able to 'step back' and look at the wider situation, they almost certainly should have been able to guesstimate some power settings, trim appropriately to lower the nose to recover to a normal flight attitude and hang on until they could trouble-shoot the frozen pitot tubes that had caused the air data computers to lose airspeed info.
That presumes the aircraft and/or its various monitoring and control systems have an awareness of what information is or isn't known.
Unfortunately, in a failure scenario, your most obvious sign of trouble is usually not a clear an unambiguous warning, but a perplexing disagreement between various data.
Your problem is 1) identifying this state 2) identifying a corrective / maintenance action and 3) executing on this. Hopefully before you run into a failure-to-maintain-sufficient-altitude or failure-to-maintain-core-integrity, or other appropriate sustainable operational mode.
> In the case of Flight 447, Air France’s pilots’ union has pointed a finger at Airbus by suggesting that the stall warning system on the A330 likely contributed to the doomed flight crew’s confusion by sounding only intermittently even though the plane remained in a stall the whole time.
> In the Air France crash, for example, investigators noted that the plane’s critical angle of attack “was not directly displayed to the pilots” [...]
Not only were they overloaded with useless noise, but critical information was either delivered in a confusing way, by design, or hidden from view...
At one point, they were at full thrust, nose-up, and climbing, yet in the heat of a storm of warnings, they failed to recognize that the airframe, engines, wings were all performing exactly as designed, aside from a panicking computer.
At that point they had completely lost situational awareness, and held the plane nose-up and falling until it contacted the water. If they had been able to 'step back' and look at the wider situation, they almost certainly should have been able to guesstimate some power settings, trim appropriately to lower the nose to recover to a normal flight attitude and hang on until they could trouble-shoot the frozen pitot tubes that had caused the air data computers to lose airspeed info.