I mean, it's reasonable to link it with a physical location, but only to the extent that there's obviously A computer at the location that is being used for some purpose. The problem is when they use it to try to identify an individual, which is completely unreasonable.
> obviously A computer at the location that is being used for some purpose
Well "A computer" could be any TCP/IP enabled device nowadays, including a router. So no, it's not reasonable to look at traffic coming from an IP, and say that traffic originated from the physical location of that IP, just because the LAN beyond that router is opaque.
I mean, several ISP IP addresses are involved with routing, but "everybody knows" they're shared machines. But again, simply because a trace route stops at a certain machine doesn't mean the routing actually terminates there - for most cases this is not true. It's just that the person behind the router with NAT often owns all devices on the LAN/opaque side. Using this correlation alone is dangerously inaccurate.
I never implied that a system in that network was the origin of the traffic, but if a traceroute ends there then obviously SOMETHING at that location is involved, knowingly or not.
A search warrant leading to a malware infected machine is acceptable in my eyes. Again, tying traffic to a location is fine, as long as the correlation ends at the computer that originally appears to be the source of the traffic (even if it ultimately isn't) is all that is targeted until evidence can determine the individual behind it.
> A search warrant leading to a malware infected machine is acceptable in my eyes.
Search warrant for what? All TCP/IP enabled devices? Or the router? An IP address doesn't even uniquely identify a single device.
(Also given how search warrants are executed in the US and how long they can seize these devices for, I don't know if I'd say it's "acceptable". I'm in favour of setting the bar high to protect the innocent.)
